Lacan, ‘The Matrix’, and ‘The Sublime Object of Ideology’

The psychoanalyst and philosopher Jaques Lacan is often associated with the post-structuralist school of thought. However, in The Sublime Object of Ideology (1989) Slavoj Zizek distances Lacan from ‘the field of “post-structuralism”’ and writes against this ‘distorted picture of Lacan’s obscurantism’. Instead, Zizek locates him within the lineage of rationalism, envisaging him as ‘the most radical contemporary version of the Enlightenment’.[1] Zizek sees a new approach to ideology possible in a ‘return to Hegel’ through a Lacanian reading, which doesn’t fall into any kind of postmodernist ‘traps’, such as ‘the illusion that we live in a “post-ideological” condition’.[2] I thought it would be interesting to discuss the break from post-structuralism Zizek sees with Lacan in relation to The Matrix (1999).

 

In The Matrix, the ‘matrix’ is effectively an illusion designed to mask the ‘real’ state of the world; that the human race are actually slaves to a robotic superpower created as a product of unethical ecological destruction, and are (somewhat ironically) being harvested in fields for energy which the robots use to sustain themselves. The film has obvious Marxist points to make – that an abstract power (capitalism) is enslaving the human population for energy (money), keeping them in a powerless position by feeding them the illusion that they are in fact free – the matrix (bourgeois democracy), and tapping into millennial fears of global warming (in the matrix the humans ‘scorch’ the sky) and unchecked technological progress.

 

The matrix functions in some respects like an Althusserian ideology; from birth human beings are unknowingly interpellated, unable to understand the ‘real’ state of affairs, as their perception is intrinsically limited, being filtered through the matrix itself. The matrix is even shown to be ‘readable’ from the outside world like a language, as a stream of hieroglyphic symbols. This is in a sense (a somewhat simplified) post-structuralist view of language; that we live in a world of meaningless signs,[3] or words, which construct our version of reality, whilst having little or no connection to the way the world ‘really’ is. The language of the matrix is entirely anti-descriptive; it inscribes rather than describes. The post-structuralist theorist Jean Baudrillard’s Simulacra and Simulation even makes an appearance in the film (though Baudrillard stated that the film largely misunderstands his work).[4]

the matrix

However, there are various problems with the way the matrix (ideology, language) is portrayed. From the start the protagonist Neo feels that there ‘is something missing’, that in the matrix things don’t seem to add up, and that the world in which he lives is somehow lacking. He begins to live a ‘double life’, by day he works in an office, and by night is a computer-hacker, essentially turning the language of the matrix against itself, in order to find the truth of things (the matrix is envisioned as a futuristic encryption program). The fact that Neo already feels there is something amiss however, implies that this sense of lack is somehow already part of the matrix, that there is a way out already built in to the very language of the matrix. Why is the matrix constructed in such a way that it is possible for people to feel something is missing, and to imagine that the matrix is an illusion?

 

This is variously explained as a mistake on the part of the robots, who are unable to fully grasp the very human requirements which would make the matrix entirely convincing. And of course, Neo is also ‘the chosen one’ (though he is at the start positioned as an ordinary everyman in order that we as an audience identify with his journey to disillusionment) and is therefore the singular genius who has somehow been endowed with the superpowers which allow him to see beyond the illusion, the world of meaningless signs, and is even able to manipulate the matrix itself in the later movies.

 

The film generally encourages a cynical perspective of reality, whilst offering some straightforward answers to very difficult and vague questions such as ‘why do I feel that something is lacking from reality?’ This sense of lack is manipulated for the Marxist environmentalist message the film wishes to promulgate, addressing the audience thus: ‘you too feel that there is something wrong, some truth which has been concealed from you’ and that ‘this is because in reality you are a slave to capitalism, you are being exploited and lied to, whilst the environment is being destroyed in your name’. The underlying message of the film is to mistrust modern notions of progress, desiring a return to a simpler, pre-capitalist, ‘golden age’ where humans live in harmony with nature.

 

The film also offers a ‘safe space’ (an outside to the matrix), a position of distance from which ideologies can be critiqued without prejudice, which seems to be at odds with the post-structuralist elements of the movie. That there is ‘no meta-language’ (an unprejudiced ‘safe’ language with which one can critique other languages) is a commonplace post-structuralist assertion.[5] In post-structuralism the classic opposition between text (the matrix) and its external reading is replaced by one continuous literary text, an infinite intertextuality of which any interpretation is automatically already part of the process (there is no escape from the matrix, nowhere outside the system). The Matrix, from a post-structuralist perspective, falls into the error of attempting to give clear definition to the ‘real’ world, a world beyond the matrix and free of illusions.

 

In post-structuralist writing, any truth-claim (an attempt to reveal the real world, the true meaning behind the illusion) is deliberately avoided, preferring to reveal the mechanisms which construct a ‘truth’ themselves, and by constantly pointing to the illusory nature of language, which can never say what it ‘really’ means.  However, as Zizek writes:

‘The position from which the deconstructivist can always make sure of the fact that “there is no metalanguage”, that no utterance can say precisely what it intended to say, that the process of enunciation always subverts the utterance, is the position of metalanguage in its purest, most radical form […] That is why post-structualist poeticism is ultimately affected. The whole effort to write ‘poetically’, to make us feel how our own text is already caught in a decentered network of plural processes and how this textual process always subverts what we “intended to say” […] is a clearly defined theoretical position which can be articulated without difficulty in a pure and simple metalanguage.’[6]

 

There is a third version of reality which The Matrix is in dialogue with; that of the audience, our own version of reality. The film reflects our reality back to us as the matrix, an illusion, revealing the effects of our own interpellation, the way reality is constructed through language, and positions the audience in a space that allows criticism of such ideologies. Is this not the post-structuralist agenda at its most basic, as Zizek writes, to ‘expose the textual mechanisms producing the truth effect’?[7]

 

The post-structuralist assertion that ‘there is no metalanguage’, according to Zizek, should actually be taken as ‘there is no object-language’ – that there is no transparent means of describing reality (the object) through language. Whereas in Lacan’s teaching, Zizek explains:

‘the proposition “there is no metalanguage” is to be taken literally. It means that all language is in a way an object-language: there is no language without object. Even when the language is apparently caught in a self-referential movement, even when it is apparently speaking about only itself, there is an objective, non-signifying ‘reference’ to this movement. The Lacanian mark is, of course, the objet petit a. The self-referential movement of the signifier is not that of a closed circle, but an elliptical movement around a certain void. And the objet petit a, as the original lost object which in a way coincides with its own loss, is precisely the embodiment of this void.’[8]

 

The post-structuralist view, therefore, doesn’t account for the way in which the position of metalanguage, a ‘safe-space’, is implied through language itself. Lacanian theory, on the contrary, envisions the flaw of language, the implication that something is ‘beyond’, that something ‘real’ is missing, as in-built and paradoxically, a condition of language – although this real is always fundamentally unattainable in a positive sense. As Zizek writes, ‘the mask is not simply hiding the real state of things; the ideological distortion is written into its very essence.’[9]

 

The Lacanian Real is a void, an absence, around which all language is structured and yet is impossible to adequately describe. In this way the Real can only be signaled negatively, as a lack. It is perhaps no coincidence then, that the city in the world outside the matrix is named ‘Zion’ (in Judaism often synonymous with Jerusalem, but within the Rastafarian movement represents a utopian place of unity or heaven), an embodiment of all that reality seems to lack. In this way fantasies – such as the utopian ‘real world’ of The Matrix – become necessary illusions; they prop up our version of reality, by filling in these holes, these absences of meaning in the symbolic order, mitigating the trauma of the Real, and in this process become sublime; the ‘sublime object of ideology’.

 

 

– Jack Thurland, 2nd Year Literature student

 



[1] Slavoj Zizek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London, Verso: 2008) p. xxx.

[2] Ibid., p. xxxi.

[3] Ibid., p. 23.

[4] http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/24/opinion/editorial-observer-a-french-philosopher-talks-back-to-hollywood-and-the-matrix.html?pagewanted=1

[5] Zizek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, p. 171.

[6] Ibid., p.173.

[7] Ibid., p. 172.

[8] Ibid., P. 177-8.

[9] Ibid., p. 25.

Katherine Mansfield and the Bloomsbury Set

Katherine Mansfield’s letters and journals, much like her fiction, read as wonderful, fragmentary little vignettes of life, which find and exult the extraordinary in the everyday. Mansfield is both funny and profound, at times dazzling with her sharp wit as she reviews books and relates (what I suppose could now be called) Bloomsbury gossip, and at other moments, sometimes within the same entry, she is dark and troubled, as she comes to terms with the difficulties of living and dying, struggling with her extrapulmonary tuberculosis, and crippling bouts of self-doubt and depression.

Katherine Mansfield

Her portrait of the novelist D. H. Lawrence and his wife Frieda, in a journal entry entitled ‘Remembrances’, is particularly vivid and touching:

‘Always, when I see foxgloves, I think of the Lawrences.

Again I pass in front of their cottage and in the window – between the daffodil curtains with the green spots – there are the great, sumptuous blooms.

“And how beautiful they are against the whitewash!” cry the Lawrences.

As is their custom, when they love anything they make a sort of Festa. With foxgloves everywhere. And then they sit in the middle of them, like blissful prisoners, dining in an encampment of Indian Braves’.

Their mutual love of nature is something that seems to connect Mansfield with Lawrence, in both their friendship and writing. In her journal she writes that his presence makes her feel ‘green’, and proclaims that she is ‘more like L[awrence] than anybody […] unthinkably alike, in fact.’ Mansfield also remarks in a letter to the painter Dorothy Brett:

‘I Loved him. He was just his old merry, rich self, laughing, describing things, giving you pictures, full of enthusiasm and joy in a future where we all become ‘Vagabonds’ – we simply did not talk about people. We kept to things like nuts and cowslips and fires in the woods and his black self was not. Oh there is something so loveable about him and his eagerness for life – that is what one loves so.’

This ‘black self’ of Lawrence’s, is the stubborn, hostile, violent side of his character. Mansfield notes that, whilst she and her husband J. M. Murry were staying with him and Frieda in Cornwall, he had ‘gone a little out of his mind […] if he is contradicted about anything’ or if anyone says ‘anything which isn’t quite “safe”’, he flies off in one of these rages, and ‘whatever your disagreement is about he says it is because you have gone wrong in your sex and belong to an obscene spirit’. Being with Lawrence in these moods, Mansfield writes, was ‘like sitting on a railway station with Lawrence’s temper like a big black engine puffing and snorting’. However, Mansfield blames these rages, which often turned violent, largely on the antagonistic presence of Frieda (who she found trying at best). She recounts an instance in which, sparked by a disagreement over Shelley’s ‘Ode to a Skylark’, Lawrence ‘beat her – he beat her to death – her head and face and breast and pulled out her hair’. ‘I don’t know which disgusts me worse’, she writes, ‘when they are very loving and playing with each other or when they are roaring at each other and he is pulling out Frieda’s hair’.

This ‘black self’ which Mansfield links with imagery of industry, of coal and smoke, is something that often crops up in Lawrence’s fiction; Mansfield herself reads a play of his and finds it ‘black with miners’. But the ‘eagerness for life’ and his ‘joy in a future’ in which we all become ‘Vagabonds’ that Mansfield enjoys and so aptly describes, is also apparent in his writing. Particularly in Women in Love, a novel inspired by the events of this summer in Cornwall, and in which Mansfield is taken as inspiration for the icy, self-destructive character of Gudrun.

Lawrence’s influence seems to spill over into other letters and journal entries of the same period. Three days after Armistice Day, she wrote in a letter to Lady Ottoline Morrel on the 13th of November 1918:

‘I opened the window and it really did seem – just in those first few moments that a wonderful change happened – not in human creatures hearts – no – but in the air, there seemed just for a breath of time – a silence, like the silence that comes after the last drop of rain has fallen – you know?

It was so wonderful – and I saw that in our garden a lilac bush had believed the South wind and was covered in buds –‘

But this optimism doesn’t extend to humanity. Mansfield, noting the ‘drunks passing the house on Monday night, singing the good old pre-war drunken rubbish’ made her feel ‘cold with horror’, fearing a continuation of the attitudes of which the First World War was a result, rather than a new beginning. She wishes that nations and individuals would ‘fly at each other, kiss and cry and share everything.’ She wonders why ‘people hide and withdraw and suspect’, feeling, like Lawrence (in a sentence which could almost be from Women in Love), that it is because of a ‘lack of heart: a sort of blight on them which will not let them ever to come to full flower.’

The letters also capture well her relationship with Virginia Woolf,  close friend and chief literary rival, whose short story, Night and Day, Mansfield reviewed for her husband’s literary magazine Athenaeum in November 1919. In a letter to Murry, she admits that she ‘didn’t like it […] My private opinion is that it is a lie on the soul. The war never has been: that is what the message is’. As artists, she declares, ‘we are traitors if we feel otherwise: we have to take into account and find new expressions, new moulds for thoughts and feelings’, something which she believes Woolf has failed to do: a cardinal sin for the modernist writer.

Taking this as an opportunity to distance herself from the Bloomsbury group, Mansfield confesses she inwardly ‘despises’ them as a ‘set of cowards’, finding their ‘intellectual snobbery’, which Woolf’s Night and Day ‘reeks’ of, ‘long and tâhsõme’. She berates Woolf for being old fashioned and out of touch, comparing Night and Day to Jane Austen, and stipulates that ‘What has been stands, but Jane Austen could not write Northanger Abbey now – or if she did, I’d have none of her.’

This review did not go unnoticed by Woolf. As she wrote in her diaries:

‘Katherine Mansfield wrote a review which irritated me – I thought I saw spite in it. A decorous elderly dullard she describes me; Jane Austen up to date. Leonard [Woolf’s husband] supposes that she let her wish for my failure have its way with her pen. But what I perceive in all this is that praise hardly warms; blame stings far more keenly; and both are somehow at arms length.’

Mansfield however, almost immediately regretted what she had written, noting that ‘my review of Virginia haunts me’, feeling she may have ‘missed it’, and calling herself a ‘cursed little creature’. Between October 1919 and January 1920 Mansfield was holed up in a villa near the French-Italian border, suffering badly from her illness. She became lonely and frustrated, her moods tempestuous, and so these harsh reviews, written during this period, may be in part attributed to her illness. Mansfield wrote later to Murry that ‘it is my illness which has made me so bad-tempered at times. Alas! one can’t fight without getting battle stained, and alas! there have been so many occasions when I’ve never had time to wash away the stains or renew myself […] You must forget these melancholy things, my own precious darling.’

It is clear in the Letters and Journals, that life was a constant fight for Mansfield:

‘In the middle of the night I decided I couldn’t stand – not another day – not another hour – but I have decided that so often – In France and in Looe, and have stood it. “So that proves,” as they would say, “it was a false alarm”. It doesn’t. Each time I have decided that, I’ve died again. Talk about a pussy’s nine lives: I must have 900. […] I walk up and down, look at the bed, look at the writing table, look in the glass and am frightened of that girl with burning eyes, think “Will my candle last until it’s light?”’ Though at this stage, recovered from a bout of physical illness, Mansfield is still anxious, and clearly terrified by the ‘idea that one must die, and may be going to die…’ adding that ‘I really have suffered such AGONIES from loneliness and illness combined that I’ll never be quite whole again …’

The struggle to live and the struggle to write, often seem entwined for Mansfield – the creative process both immensely difficult, and her only source of pleasure:

‘I pose myself, yet once more my eternal question. What is it that makes the moment of delivery so difficult for me? If I were to sit down – now – and just write out, plain, some of the stories – all written, all ready, in my mind ‘twould take me days. There are so many of them. I sit and think them out, and if I overcome my lassitude and do take the pen they ought (they are so word perfect) to write themselves […] And don’t I want to write them? Lord! Lord! It’s my only desire – my one happy issue. And only yesterday I was thinking – even in my present state of health is a great gain. It makes things so rich, so important, so longed for … changes one’s focus.’

However, in January 1923 Mansfield finally lost the battle with her illness, dying aged 34. Her life and career, short as they were, left behind a wealth of literature to influence countless generations after her, and if anything, her story serves as a reminder to those who falter and doubt, of the preciousness of time, and of their potential to make a lasting impression.

Woolf gives a heartfelt eulogy, in a diary entry just after her death:

‘When I began to write, it seemed to me there was no point in writing. Katherine won’t read it. Katherine’s my rival no more […] Did she care for me? Sometimes she would say so – would kiss me – would look at me as if (is this sentiment?) her eyes would like always to be faithful. She would promise never to forget. That was what she said at the end of our last talk […] I was jealous of her writing – the only writing I have ever been jealous of […] Probably we had something in common which I shall never find in anyone else’.

Jack  Thurland, 2nd  Year English Literature.

Katherine Mansfield, The Letters and Journals of Katherine Mansfield: A Selection, ed., C. K. Stead, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977).

Virginia Woolf, Virginia Woolf: Selected Diaries, ed., Anne Olivier Bell, (London: Random House, 2008).

 

 

‘No such thing as sexuality’: Lacan and All Saints’ ‘Pure Shores’

‘There is no such thing as sexuality’, writes the French psychoanalyst Jaques Lacan, a statement hard to swallow in a society seemingly saturated by sex and sexuality. Sex, perhaps more apparent now than ever, seems to be the driving force of life, an integral part of our culture, and the way we come to define ourselves.

Pop music, increasingly, serves as both an outlet and a stage upon which the sexual fantasies of society are exorcised, performed, and consumed. In a recent interview, Lady Gaga told the press how ‘sex is an inspiration for everyone, and I don’t think there is one song that’s ever been written that sex wasn’t a part of. That’s what makes the world go round’.

Modern psychoanalysis, however, reveals these desires as nothing more than an attempt to overcome a sense of incompleteness or lack, and attain an imagined sense of wholeness or unity.

This is exemplified, perhaps surprisingly, by 90s pop sensation All Saints in their hit song ‘Pure Shores’, which merges the notion of sexual conquest with that of self-discovery, and the longing for a sense of home; ‘the beach’.

The beach, the object of desire, at once the lover and a thinly veiled metaphor for the paradise of sexual fulfillment, is searched for ‘along many moors’, ‘through many doors’, ‘across deserts’, across ‘water for miles’, and yet remains fundamentally ‘out of reach’. ‘I’m coming’, repeatedly sing All Saints, a double entendre suggesting both the momentary bliss of orgasm, and the larger never-ending journey towards the beach of eternal bliss.

This beach, we come to learn, is not only unattainable, but also imaginary; the singer(s) having ‘never been here before’ (at a brief moment of arrival, perhaps in a dream, as the lyrics immediately revert to longing once again). This is, as Slavoj Zizek writes, ‘the impossible object cause of desire that inaugurates desire itself’. This object of desire doesn’t exist because it is imaginary, leaving the singer permanently in search ‘of more’, left with an insatiable appetite in the pursuit of perfection, or as Lacan might say, for the lost sense of unity first imagined in the mirror stage of infancy. Hence the beach becomes a place ‘I can call mine’, a place where I can own myself, become autonomous and whole. The journey to the beach becomes an escape from the world of mutability to one of permanence and complete ownership.

The desire for the beach can also be seen as a desire for death. The beach becomes symbolic not just of physical bliss, but the eternal spiritual bliss associated with the afterlife. The beach is heaven, a place where one can stop ‘moving’, ‘coming’, and cease to be.

The notion of an unattainable beyond-space also bears similarities to Lacan’s notion of the Real, that which escapes symbolization, the leftover from reality which language fails to adequately describe. As Sean Homer writes, according to Lacan, ‘the real is that which is unsymbolizable. It is beyond the symbolic and the imaginary and acts as a limit to both’. The sea, the desert, the countless doors through which the singer navigates, can therefore be seen as metaphors for the barren, impotent symbolic order of the world in which we are born, one which can signal obliquely but cannot fully represent the Real. The Beach, and the desire for the beach, is an attempt to mask over this void, or gap in the symbolic order.

Rather than deny the existence of sexual relationships, Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory reveals our sexual desires as always being the manifestation of something else, a deeper, darker desire to achieve a lost unity, which can be found lurking beneath the surface of even the most fatuous of pop songs.

Jack Thurland, 2nd Year English Literature.